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Cassidy 1 
Introduction 
 
This thesis submits that extraterritorial communities become magnified versions of their 
nation through the ways in which they imagine their genuineness. Benedict Anderson argues for an 
anthropological understanding of nations as ​imagined communities​. Noncontiguous national 
possessions are highly visible demonstrations of this concept for the nation and its populations here 
imagine the communities to be as genuine as the communities in the nation’s ordinary territorial 
bounds. Anderson claims that imagined communities are established, not by authenticity, but by the 
ways​ they seek it. He writes that the nation seeks authenticity through imagining itself as ​limited​, as 
sovereign​, and as ​a community​.  These elements are amplified in extraterritorial places where the state 1
and the residing nationals face greater challenges of legitimizing both a claim on land–which is often 
contested by proximate nations and others–and a belonging to a geographically distant mother 
country. The paper explores the cases of Ceuta and Melilla, two cities located within northern 
Morocco which were established in 1580 and 1497 as Spanish ​colonies​, in 1912 as ​protectorates​, and 
exist today as ​autonomous cities​ or ​enclaves​.  In these places, one walks amongst Spanish architecture 2
and pays in Euros, only reminded by the surrounding walls that one is not in mainland Spain.  3
Communities at these sites of Europe’s southernmost borders express ​nation-ness​, as “the most 
1 Anderson, Benedict. ​Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism​. Verso, 2016. (6-7) 
2 Alexander, Isabella. “Waiting to Burn: Spanish-Maghribi Relations and the Making of a New Migrant Class.” ​The Journal 
of North African Studies​, vol. 24, no. 1, 17 Apr. 2018, pp. 152–174., doi:10.1080/13629387.2018.1459268. 
3 Harris, Johnny, director. ​Europe’s Most Fortified Border Is in Africa​. YouTube, Vox, 5 Dec. 2017, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=LY_Yiu2U2Ts. 
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universally legitimate value in the political life of our time,”  in extraordinarily visible ways, making the 4
cities ideal settings for studying national imagination.  
Spain, the city councils, and the Spaniards who live in the cities endeavor to preserve the 
nation-ness of these cities, or what can be called their ​Spanishness​. All depend on imagining these 
communities to be no less Spanish than those in the mainland, serving a dual purpose of countering 
Morocco’s claim on the land and dispelling fears that a European presence in Africa incites in the 
European Union and its populations. As E.U. territories, the enclaves are economically enticing, 
attracting Muslims from nearby poverty-stricken Morocco as well as black migrants from other poor 
or else conflict-ridden countries in Africa. Infiltration of these two foremost categories of ​others​ in the 
cities, which their geography has disposed them to, has resulted in an amplified national discourse 
against immigration and multiculturalism.  So, in pursuit of the imaginative qualities that authenticate 5
a nation, the cities go to considerable lengths to prohibit these ‘others’ from living peacefully within or 
from entering at all. Authorities devise obstacles ranging from marginalization to abuse as a means to 
exclude and deter, many of which are concentrated around the cities’ borders. Highly visible 
limitations, manifestations of sovereignty, and conceptualizations of community are mobilized here to 
fix the cities as genuine pieces of Spain.  6
On land, approximately 8.5 and 10 kilometers enclose Ceuta and Melilla, respectively. These 
boundaries are unmistakable, demarcated by exceptionally striking borders. Weaponized and heavily 
surveilled, the walls appear to serve a military purpose, but in fact their intent is to keep out civilians. 
4 Anderson 3. 
5 Human Rights Watch. Salmi, Katya, et al. ​Abused and Expelled: Ill-Treatment of Sub-Saharan African Migrants in 
Morocco​. Human Rights Watch, 2014, 
www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/10/abused-and-expelled/ill-treatment-sub-saharan-african-migrants-morocco#page. 
6 Anderson 4. 
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More pronounced in Ceuta and Melilla is the exclusion which, in the age of nationhood and 
globalization, has become ingrained in border regimes and “state-defined identity categories,” such as 
the refugees and asylum seekers attempting to enter Europe here.  Community limits are violently 7
amplified through categorically terminable, increasingly militarized boundaries and the resulting 
spectacle. 
In navigating their many-sided geographic disposition, Spain recognized sovereignty ​in​ Ceuta 
and Melilla by distinguishing them from their counterparts in the mainland. 1995 saw the cities, 
declaring to be no different from those in peninsular Spain, succeed in acquiring a degree of local 
self-governance. Even so, they still fall under the jurisdiction of the central government in Madrid 
more than other cities do. On the other hand, Spain wields sovereignty ​over​ Ceuta and Melilla through 
the illusive third-party political agreements in which it seeks to empower the territories. Consequently, 
“political sovereignty, like the nation itself, comes to have an ever greater imagined dimension”  in 8
these places. Hence, Spain perceives the clandestine migrants who succeed in crossing the borders as 
making a mockery of the state’s ‘innate’ powers, ridiculing its border controls. Moreover, their 
‘invasion,’ which is feared to bring with it disease, ‘strange’ culture, and “backpacks full of poverty” 
threatens the legitimacy of Spain’s regional authority, demanding that great lengths be devised to halt 
it.  Analyzing these particular devices informs an understanding on the common fragility and 9
sensitivity of the extant sovereign place. 
Notwithstanding the inequality and exploitation prevailing in the nation, the community here 
is still “always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”  Spanish fraternity is reinforced through 10
7 Jones, Reece. ​Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move​. Verso, 2017. (22) 
8 Brown, Wendy. ​Walled States, Waning Sovereignty​. Zone Books, 2017. (47) 
9 Andersson, Ruben. ​Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe​. University of California 
Press, 2014. (5) 
10 Anderson 7. 
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the ways in which ‘others’ are marginalized. Targeted policies single out Muslims who have moved out 
of Morocco into the enclaves, violating the liberties which they should be equally entitled to as 
officially Spanish citizens. Migrants who manage to cross into the cities face an abundance of 
additional obstacles upon arrival. Limits and sovereignty together feed the overall imagining of the 
community. While some modes of ​resistance​ employed by ‘others’ are explored in the first two 
chapters, they comprise more of the discussion in the culminating final chapter on community.  
Moreover, this paper explains how the persisting ​push factors​ which drive the global poor or 
otherwise disadvantaged to seek opportunity in wealthier nations cannot be dissuaded by a nation’s 
best efforts to ‘defend’ itself. It emphasizes that Ceuta and Melilla and their geography will always be 
pull factors​ for migrants and Moroccan nationals, all seeking the better wages and opportunities that a 
privileged European land can offer them and that their own lands cannot.  
From Monarchy to Nation 
Understanding the modern imagining of these communities calls for a grasp on the historical 
foundations which gave way to the formation of the present Spanish state. Anderson explains that 
“after 1789 the principle of Legitimacy had to be loudly and self-consciously defended, and, in the 
process, ‘monarchy’ became a semi-standardized model.”  Before the era of nations, the ​Reconquista​ – 11
the expansion of Christian kingdoms and expulsion of Muslim rulers from the Iberian Peninsula in 
1492 – principally defined the legitimacy of Spanish rule. As it is often professed to be “one of the 
most important symbols of historic identity for Spaniards, especially those in Southern Spain,” the 
conquest over the Moors provides insight for contemporary marginalization of Muslims living in 
11 Ibid 21.  
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Ceuta and Melilla.  Subsequently, the ​Conquista​ of the Americas fits into Anderson’s chronicle of the 12
“conception of ‘Empire” through a colonial racism, which ventured to merge dynastic legitimacy and 
national community. Today this “principle of innate, inherited superiority”  prevails in the 13
discrimination against black migrants forming the present ‘crisis’ at the borders of the cities. 
Appropriation and monopolization of the Spanish nationalist conversation by Francoists and 
anti-democratic conservatives had “a significant impact on the entire spectrum of Spanish nationalism, 
particularly when it was forced to present a democratically legitimized face in the last years of 
Francoism and during the democratic transition.”  Today, there is not one succinct Spanish 14
nationalism, but rather varying nationalist discourses.  Endorsing the Francoist version on the right 15
end of the spectrum is the Partido Popular (PP). As a Christian conservative political party, the 
members insist that the past historical feats cemented the “intrinsically Catholic nature of the Spanish 
nation.”  Furthermore, they hold that peripheral nations are “mostly a product of foreign conspiracies 16
to weaken Spain’s power and to erase its glorious contribution to the history of mankind.” José-María 
Aznar, the Spanish prime minister/president from 1996-2004, upheld this belief: 
“According to Aznar, Spain is a historical reality forged in the fifteenth century and united by 
the agency of the Monarchy and the existence of a common project, whose best expression 
would be the benign and generous Spanish conquest of America. This historical tradition 
sustains the legitimacy of the Spanish nation, which exists prior to the liberal Spanish 
constitutions.’”  17
12 Colón, Gabriel Alejandro Torres. “Of Muslim Persuasion: The Politics of Convivencia in Ceuta, Spain.” ​University of 
New Mexico​, UNM Digital Repository, 2008. (63) 
13 Anderson 150.  
14 Núñez, Xosé-Manoel. “What Is Spanish Nationalism Today? From Legitimacy Crisis to Unfulfilled Renovation 
(1975–2000).” ​Ethnic and Racial Studies​, vol. 24, no. 5, 2001, pp. 719–752., doi:10.1080/01419870120063954. (721) 
15 Ibid 742. 
16 Ibid 729.  
17 Ibid 729.  
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Spaniards like Aznar are the kind to support the occupation of Ceuta and Melilla, inventing a nation 
where it does not exist.  To them, imperialism and Catholicism are inextricable from Spanish identity. 18
If being Christian is the metric for belonging within Spain – and considering the historical context of 
the conquest over the Arabs – Ceuta and Melilla appear to be less Spanish, necessitating 
reinforcements of polarity between Christians and non-Christians, especially those from the Maghreb. 
On the other side of the debate is the Spanish Workers’ Socialist Party (PSOE),  whose 19
followers propose the legitimacy of Friedrich Meinecke’s distinction ‘cultural’ and ‘political’ nations. 
They believe that “the history of a plurality of identities within a common Spanish project would 
legitimize the survival of Spain as a nation, though permitting cultural pluralism and political sharing 
of power with regional administrations” but that Spain should, nevertheless, retain full sovereignty.  20
They advocate for ​constitutional ​nationalism, though they often avoid this label, opting instead for 
‘patriotism.’ The left fears that, should the state be deprived of its “emotional, cultural or historical 
appeals to a common citizen identity,” it would be unable to survive as a legitimate national entity.  21
“The defenders of Spanish constitutional nationalism, be it based upon the idea of a ‘nation of 
nations’ or on the concept of ‘historical and cultural plurality,’ insist on its purportedly purely 
civic nature. Conversely, minority stateless nationalisms are accused of being culturalist, 
essentialist, ethnocentrist and potentially anti-democratic as far as their basic ideological 
foundations are concerned.”  22
 
Most defenders today of this constitutional nationalism, or patriotism,“accept the 1978 
Constitutional agreement as the legitimate basis for maintaining the political unity of Spain, and for 
advocating Spain’s national existence.”  The Spanish Constitution of 1978 declares the following: 23
18 Anderson 3. 
19 Núñez 721.  
20 Ibid 736.  
21 Ibid 738.  
22 Núñez 744. 
23 Ibid 742. 
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“The Constitution is based on the indivisible unity of the Spanish Nation, common and 
indivisible Fatherland of all Spaniards. The right to autonomy for the nationalities and regions 
which form it and of solidarity among them is acknowledged and guaranteed (Article 2 of the 
Introductory Section of the Constitution).”  24
During the debates in parliament, ‘nationality’ was reduced to mean ‘cultural and linguistic 
community.’  In curating a Spanish democracy post-dictatorship, the Constitution’s primary concern 25
was decentralization, which was eventually executed by breaking up peninsular Spain into seventeen 
autonomous communities​. Whether religious conquests or its democratic formation into a ‘nation of 
nations’ define Spain persists as the ultimate national question. It is a major point of contestation 
among political parties, which are in constant debate over what makes Spain ​Spain​, or, more 
importantly, what makes someone ​Spanish​. 
Minority nationalist populations in the mainland include the community of Catalonia, which 
was looking for self-governance in 1978, particularly concerning an official right to use, conduct 
affairs, and educate in the Catalan dialect. Minority communities in the Basque Country, however, 
pushed for full separation from the nation. Limited sovereign representation granted by the 
Constitution gratified Catalan groups but did not quite satisfy Basques nationalist demands.  But 26
these mainlands minorities all exist within the recognized, greater Spanish territory, whereas Ceuta and 
Melilla, in being encompassed by the Mediterranean and Morocco, have no physical linkage to Spain. 
Furthermore, the land and sea which they do border bring with them unavoidable interaction with 
decidedly non-Spanish nationalist demographics. While Moroccans and sub-Saharan migrants see the 
proximity to the European Union as opportunity, Spanish Ceutans and Melillans are averse to sharing 
their space, fearing that these subjects dilute the Spanishness of the cities. It is no wonder, then, that 
24 Spain, “Constitution of 1978.” 2011, ​Constitute​, ​www.constituteproject.org​, 2011. 
25 Ibid 723.  
26 Núñez 724.  
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for several years following 1978 the Spanish government was challenged by the question of how Ceuta 
and Melilla “were to fit into the territorial structure of the new Spain,” amidst the process of devolving 
power to regional autonomous communities, some with minority populations.   27
As late as 1975, Spain was rejecting accusations of colonialism regarding its enclaves on the 
basis that there was no ethnic difference between Ceutans and Melillans and the rest of Spain.  28
However, since 1960 “the number of Moroccans has doubled from 11,000 in Ceuta and quadrupled 
from under 5,000 in Melilla (Ballesteros, 1990: 140-45; ​Annuario El Pais 1992​: 114),” making it 
increasingly difficult for the authorities to present Ceuta and Melilla as “typical Spanish cities.”  29
Concern over a potential growth of Muslim populations to a position of power, accompanied by the 
escalating migrant ‘crisis,’ evolved into fear in the mainland and other European populations. 
Nationalism in extraterritorial Spain has persisted, not as the meaningful doctrine it once was, but 
rather as a response to “the challenge of stateless nationalisms.”  Spaniards here have adopted a 30
‘Spanishness’ which has taken on its own form as an “ethno culturally positive stereotype,”  31
encouraged by the sovereign Spanish nation. State efforts to marginalize and discriminate, 
underpinned by racial, religious, and colonial legacies, feed public perceptions and sow an inhospitable 
environment for non-Christian minorities.  Notably, the right-wing has a robust presence here, 32
though elections typically swing between the PP and the PSOE. The communities here, like “many 
‘old nations,’ once thought fully consolidated, find themselves challenged by ‘sub’-nationalisms within 
27 Gillespie, Richard. ​Spain and the Mediterranean: Developing a European Policy towards the South​. Macmillan Press Ltd, 
2000. (69) 
28 Ibid 67. 
29 Ibid 67.  
30 Núñez 719. 
31 Ibid 745. 
32 Andersson 6. 
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their borders... The reality is quite plain: the ‘end of the era of nationalism,’ so long prophesied, is not 
remotely in sight.”   33
Literature Review 
The thesis combines Benedict Anderson’s theories in ​Imagined Communities: Reflections on 
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism​ as well as theories surrounding illegality, borders, sovereignty, 
the ‘other’ with relevant ethnographic studies of the Ceuta and Melilla example. Anderson’s seminal 
study about nations advises the argument for the ‘hyper-nation’ of non-contiguous places. Integral, 
too, is his assertion that the authorities and people of a country ​image​ nation-ness in an effort to 
legitimize power over communities. The understanding of legitimacy and why the nation defends it, 
such as religion, conquest, and identity, are incorporated throughout. However, his examples, such as 
soldiers’ graves and printmaking, are not relevant here. Rather, this work seeks examples of his central 
ideas (limits, sovereignty, and community) in the Spanish national possessions, primarily the ​othering 
which constitutes their imaginary. 
Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe​ by Ruben 
Andersson provides theory on illegality and clandestinity, as well as much of the border descriptions, 
different critical moments of ‘the spectacle,’ and many of the ethnographic interviews from 
border-crossers and border patrol. The business of bordering Europe discussed by Andersson pairs 
well with ​Walled States, Waning Sovereignty​ by Wendy Brown, wherein she proposes that 
sovereignty is fiction, as proven by the increasingly loud and futile ways in which it is declared. 
Furthermore, Judith Butler’s ​Frames of War: When is Life Grievable​ are used to analyze how weak 
33 Anderson 3. 
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sovereignty produces the othering and the migrant ‘crisis’ happening at the doors of fenced-off places. 
All of these works weave into the Andersonian conversation on national imagination.  
Reece Jones’ ​Violent Borders​ supplies much of the critical analysis about violence. He also has a 
chapter dedicated to Melilla’s border and provides the history of its militarization. Jones explains how 
the blurring of the distinction between military and police has formed the modern border regime. A 
reports from Human Rights Watch on the ill-treatment of sub-Saharan migrants by Spanish and 
Moroccan authorities is also useful in assessing the link between borders and violence here. Actions of 
the state and reactions of excluded subjects are referred to as strategies and tactics, ideas written about 
by the social scientist Michel de Certeau in his book ​The Placement of Everyday Life​. Strategies 
“produce, tabulate, and impose” spaces, countered by tactics which “use, manipulate, and divert” 
these produced spaces. ​Strategies​ which Spain implements as ‘defense’ compels its targets to assume the 
offensive.  Methods, or ​tactics​, excluded subjects deploy in the cities include militarizing 34
border-crossing efforts, protesting, and taking advantage of a unique informal economy which is 
fostered by the inclusion of the territories in the EU. For resistance, as an instrumental tool of survival 
of minorities in a usual national territory, is heightened in non-contiguous ones as a means of rising to 
the extra challenges presented by hyper-national communities. 
 ​Spain and the Mediterranean: Developing a European Policy towards the South​ by Richard 
Gillespie is crucial in equipping the paper with a fundamental history of the protectorates. Gillespie’s 
chapter on Morocco lays out the issue of the enclaves’ autonomy, detailing its contestation amongst 
the different political parties in mainland Spain as well as Morocco’s claim on the cities. Isabella 
Alexander provides more personal accounts through her ethnographic works as do the interviews 
34 Certeau, Michel de. ​The Practice of Everyday Life​. University of Minnesota Press, 1998. (36) 
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conducted by Human Rights Watch. A work from Xosé-Manoel Núñez supports most of the 
discussion on ​Spanish​ nationalism specifically. In his piece “What Is Spanish Nationalism Today? 
From Legitimacy Crisis to Unfulfilled Renovation (1975–2000),” he explores the legacies of Francoist 
nationalism and responses from different political parties to nationalist minorities throughout the late 
twentieth century. Though a couple of decades matured, its analysis is aptly applied to the 
protectorate problem today. Núñez himself makes this clear, as he points in his conclusion to the 
growing migrant ‘crisis’ and the ever-growing trials of coexistence accompanying the Europeanization 
of Melilla and Ceuta.  
A central flaw to this paper is the absence of Moroccan literature. While drawing from a few 
Moroccan news sources, it is lacking in works of Moroccan academia. Research proved to procure 
some of these texts, of which most were not valuable to the thesis. Perhaps they are written in Arabic 
or French on different databases or perhaps there are not as many works because of the nature of the 
monarchy to, at times, silence Moroccan journalists and authors writing on unsavory topics. 
This paper navigates language very purposefully. Andersson’s qualification of non-refugee 
migrants as ​clandestine​ is the one used here because it accurately captures their configuration within 
the national narrative as ‘less than’ or ‘sub’ and alludes to the resulting secrecy and tactics they must 
rely on. The label of ‘sub-Saharan African,’ though used by many who identify as such, is very general, 
and this paper tries to always specify where migrants come from in the monolith that is ‘Africa’ and 
the collective ‘sub-Saharan Africa.’ As for Moroccan nationals living within the enclaves, they will be 
referred to as such, or as ‘Moroccans’ and sometimes ‘Muslims.’ ‘Arab’ is the lesser used term in the 
literature. ‘Muslim’ is used less frequently, primarily in direct contrast with ‘Christian,’ and while the 
Cassidy 12 
focus on Central and West African migrants in this paper is race, many of them are also Muslim. The 
flaw of ‘Moroccan’ is that it implies that they are not also Spanish. But even Moroccans whose families 
have lived in the cities for generations often retain their ethnic, cultural, and religious ties, and they are 
a community in themselves within the enclaves as their fight for multiculturalism demonstrates, so this 
will be the preferred title. Lastly, it would be remiss not to note that while the official or frequented 
terms for Ceuta and Melilla are ​enclaves​ or ​protectorates​, these are a strategy on Spain’s part to establish 
its dominance in the region. Should this paper make sole use of these terms, it would be a collaborator 
with the body whose dangerous legitimacy strategies it is attempting to thwart. While they are used 
intermittently as a reminder of the Spanish prerogative, the preferred terms for this paper are the 
aforementioned ones, such as extraterritorial communities, non-contiguous territories, hyper-national 
sites, and so forth, which also serve to more aptly encapsulate the imagined Spanishness of the cities. 
Moreover, branding the cities in various ways is a tactic of the thesis to undermine the Spanish 
narrative and impart ambiguity onto the land. 
Methodology 
Elements which characterize many nations are more visible in extraterritorial places. These are 
not unique to the territories in North Africa. Some other examples might be Oecusse, a ‘municipality’ 
and a ‘Special Administrative Region’  and an enclave of Portugal in the country of East Timor.  35 36
Here, a sustained alliance with the Portuguese has fostered a strong regional identity.  Or there is the 37
‘British Overseas Territory’ of Gibraltar, where the citizens are more pridefully British than ones living 
35 Yoder, Laura. “The Formation and Remarkable Persistence of the Oecusse-Ambeno Enclave, Timor.” ​Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies​, 2016. 
36 Up until 1975, East Timor was a Portuguese colony called ‘Portuguese Timor.’ (Yoder) 
37 Durand, Frédéric. Timor: ​1250-2005, 750 ans de cartographie et de voyage​. Toulouse, Arkuiris, 2006. 
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in mainland England.  While the function of a nationalist identity in other territories parallels that of 38
Ceuta and Melilla, the choice to focus on these cases is fed by their idiosyncrasies: the distinctive ways 
in which they have come to fruition, their prevalence as the ​only​ European territories in mainland 
Africa, and the strategies which Spain has implemented in order to curb the emotions generated by its 
close proximity to both an Islamic nation and to the growing migrant crisis. In the same vein, Spain’s 
other Mediterranean possessions are purposefully omitted from this paper’s focus. From the Canary 
Islands to the minor ​plazas de soberanía​ (places of sovereignty), including the Islas Alhucemas, the 
Islas Chafarinas, and Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera, none are disposed to the same identity struggles, 
due in large part to their lack of the same physical attachment to non-European lands.   39
In Ceuta and Melilla, the international contestation and geopolitical fragility surrounding 
them are crucial components which implore the citizens, local government, and Spain as its sovereign 
overlord to enhance the ways in which the cities’ nationness is imagined. Moreover, the number of 
migrants reaching Spain has doubled for the second year in a row as a result of the increasing 
intolerance in Italy and Greece in the Central Mediterranean route.  While securing Europe’s 40
southern external borders generally produces a spectacle, the unique position of the enclaves as the 
only European territories within the continent of Africa has generated an even greater amplified style 
of bordering and an even greater spectacle of migrants: 
“Much has been written in recent years on refugee populations stuck in similar ‘in between’ 
spaces – Afghans in Karachi or Syrians in Amman – the majority of them moving towards 
destinations in Western Europe or the U.S. (Malkki 1995; Fassin 2005; Ticktin 2006). What is 
unique about the case of those trapped in Morocco is their proximity to the imagined home. 
38 In Gibraltar, Britain is to Spain what Spain is to Morocco in Ceuta and Melilla. (Gillespie) 
39 Robinson, G.W.S. “Ceuta and Melilla: Spain’s Plazas de Soberanía.” ​Geographical Association​, vol. 43, no. 4, Nov. 1958, 
pp. 266–269. 
40 “Frontex Risk Analysis for 2019.” ​Frontex European Border and Coast Guard Agency​, 20 Feb. 2019, 
www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-publishes-risk-analysis-for-2019-Dh6Wkf​. 
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For sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco – unlike Somalis in Nairobi or Burmese in Bangkok – 
their journeys have not been stalled en route to Western Europe or the U.S., but rather at the 
border to the country they are so desperately seeking to enter.”   41
 
Andersson continues to explain that the Spanish ‘front’ is about more than one state’s efforts to 
control human movement. Rather, “it is a key site for investigating the European, or indeed Western, 
‘fight against illegal immigration’ in all its contradictions.”  42
Overview 
The three chapters of the paper address the imaginative styles of a nation through their 
magnification in the case communities. Chapter One focuses on the limitedness of Ceuta and Melilla 
by assessing the real city limits: borders. It analyzes the defensive strategies and exceptional violence 
which the Spanish state cultivates to stop, detain, and deter clandestine migrants. Chapter Two 
outlines the dual manifestations of the cities as sovereign: the fight for constitutional representation 
and the Spanish manipulation over Morocco by outsourcing ‘national security’ through third-party 
political agreements. Finally, Chapter Three explores the anxious politics of identity and belonging 
amongst Christian Ceutans and Melillans which feed prejudice and discrimination against 
non-Christians. Furthermore, it elaborates on the different methods of resistance to these 
circumstances. Altogether, these components aim to break down the Spanish imagination.   
41 Alexander 18. 
42 Andersson 22. 
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Chapter One – As Limited 
 
“Globally, more than half the deaths at borders in the past decade occurred at the edges of the EU, 
making it by far the most dangerous border crossing in the world.”  - Reece Jones 43
 
The people attempting to cross Europe’s external borders are mostly coming from its 
neighbors to the south, explaining why the Mediterranean bears the most popular points of entry. In 
2018, a total of 150,114 migrants ‘illegally’ crossed the external borders of Europe, 92 percent going by 
way of the Mediterranean. Out of them, 40 percent used the Western route through Spain. 57,034 
migrants entered in 2018, but only 1,400 did so through Ceuta and Melilla.  Despite the proximity of 44
the cities, the majority of ‘illegal’ migration into Spain occurs at the coastal boundaries of the 
mainland. One can actually stand in Africa a stone’s throw away from Europe, yet the migratory paths 
through the enclaves remain the ones less taken. Why is it that so few cross here? The first reason, the 
one addressed in this chapter, is that the business of bordering of Europe ​thrives​ beyond the confines 
of the continent.  It is exceedingly more difficult to cross the borders of Ceuta and Melilla than the 45
ones of contiguous Spain. Nonetheless, there are still some who pursue these routes. This chapter 
elaborates on how Ceuta and Melilla imagine themselves as ​limited​ and the spectacle that these 
limitations produce. 
Why Europe? 
43 Jones 16. 
44 Frontex. 
45 Andersson 3. 
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Thousands of migrants reside in makeshift camps scattered through the forests surrounding 
Ceuta and Melilla. They live in destitution just outside of their gateway to Europe. Their lodgings are 
tents made of blue plastic bags and tree limbs, secured using old t-shirts like rope.  Life consists 46
primarily of planning border-crossings and hiding from Moroccan officials, both the ​Gendarmerie 
Royale Marocaine ​and the ​Auxiliary Forces​ (or the ‘Alis’ as migrants call them). Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Ghana, and many more nations are represented among the travellers.  A variety of reasons compelled 47
them to leave their homes, from “poverty, family and social problems, political upheaval and civil 
conflict, and fear of persecution.”  Their growing numbers in these forests can be attributed to several 48
factors, such as the word ​refugee​ and its consequences.  
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is “responsible for 
protecting displaced persons around the world, assisting primarily in resettlement, integration, and 
voluntary repatriation.”  Only “people who have fled war, violence, conflict or persecution and have 49
crossed an international border to find safety in another country”  fit the UNHCR given definition 50
of a ​refugee​. As a result, the Central and West African migrants coming through Morocco, most of 
whom attribute poverty as their push factor, are left with no other options than ‘illegal’ ones, which 
have only become defined as such as a consequence of what the state considers ‘legal.’ According to 
Jones, “focusing on only the limited, state-defined term refugee renders other categories of migrants, 
46 Human Rights Watch. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Alexander 9. 
50 United Nations. “What Is a Refugee?” ​UNHCR​, www.unhcr.org/en-us/what-is-a-refugee.html.. 
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who are moving for economic or environmental reasons, as undeserving of help or sympathy.”  He 51
explains: 
“Syrian migrants’ asylum requests are very likely to succeed due to the political and religious 
violence they are fleeing. In the third quarter of 2015, 98 percent of Syrian applicants were 
granted asylum in the European Union. West African economic migrants are much less likely 
to be given asylum. For example, in the same quarter in 2015, 76 percent of requests from 
Ghana were rejected.”  52
 
Even the ambiguity surrounding the explanation of what makes someone a refugee has become a 
problem for those who ​could​ be one. Leaving room for interpretation enables nations to decide 
whether a migrant deserves the categorization.  
Those who warrant protection based on persecution are defined as “unable or unwilling to 
return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”  Take the example 53
of a young migrant from Cameroon named Olivier on his way to Spain. When interviewed by Human 
Rights Watch, he explained that he could not return home for fear that he would be killed by 
Cameroonian authorities for fleeing an army that would have required him to participate in what he 
views as the “unjustified killing of civilians.”  Yet, when he tried to apply for asylum in Morocco, 54
Olivier was told that “Cameroon is not a country where there is turbulence.”  Supposedly reviewers 55
of Olivier’s case did not deem his fear ‘well-founded.’ But Morocco was not intended to be Olivier’s 
51 Jones 23. 
52 Ibid 21. 
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final destination, nor is it for most. Regardless of the factors which push them to move, sub-Saharan 
African migrants “uniformly describe their goal as reaching Europe to create a better life.”  56
Abraham, a 22 year-old migrant from Sierra Leone, had been in Morocco for two years when 
he was interviewed about his situation. Everywhere he goes, he carries papers which prove that he has 
been granted ‘official refugee’ status by Morocco. These documents should have afforded Abraham 
the basic protections guaranteed to all refugees, yet Morocco, having no official refugee camps, is not 
equipped to provide these protections. Aware of these challenges, many will get the paperwork for 
applying for asylum at UNHCR’s Moroccan headquarters in Rabat and then postpone their claim. 
They choose to wait and have their applications reviewed “until they have reached a country they 
believe will provide them with basic protections.” In the migratory route, Morocco is merely a primary 
entry point into the internally borderless E.U. 
“[Migrants] use Morocco as a launching pad in one of three ways – most commonly, by 
scaling the fences into Morocco’s Spanish enclaves or piling into small wooden fishing boats 
that are captained across the eight-mile Strait of Gibraltar to the southern coast of mainland 
Spain. Secondly, by stowing away in the trunks, engines, or specially constructed ‘cages’ 
hidden under cars and trucks crossing into Spanish territory. Or least commonly, as it is the 
most expensive option, by carrying false paperwork across European borders.”  57
 
However, Abraham actually made numerous attempts to cross into Melilla, “but he quickly learned 
that even on European soil, race plays a role in one’s ability to assert their vulnerability, and papers do 
not always guarantee one’s legal rights,” for his official refugee status did not prevent the Spanish 
authorities from detaining him and returning him back to the Algerian desert.  58
Nevertheless, Europe persists as the dream land: a place where prosperity and opportunity 
flourish. Trapped in a purgatory between their homes and their final destinations, migrants in 
56 Human Rights Watch. 
57 Alexander 8. 
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Morocco are constantly encountering Spain in the form of a saviour. The few services available to 
them in Morocco are predominantly European, run by Spanish and French organisations and 
volunteers. Alexander writes, “imagine that as a migrant, it is the European volunteers who offer you 
food at the church on Sunday mornings, the Italian doctor who sees your sick child, the French 
woman who teaches you how to read, or the Spanish lawyer who informs you of your rights.” It is no 
surprise, then, that Europe prevails in the migrant imaginary as a land of greatness. She continues: 
“Even along the same migration routes the E.U. is so desperately trying to block, they appear at 
every turn to lend a helping hand. I discovered that for migrants, the faces of oppression – the 
extorting smugglers and aggressing police officers – are more likely to be the faces of their own 
people. It is the sub-Saharan ‘camels’ and the Moroccan police officers who violate and abuse, 
supporting the migrants’ negative images of the places they are so desperately seeking to 
escape.”  59
 
Migrants think their paperwork means little if not on European soil, which is true to an extent. But the 
soil in Ceuta and Melilla is slightly different. In its fierce limitedness, the vulnerable, non-contiguous 
soil allows even less space for migrants, especially ones from sub-Saharan Africa. Besides, Chapter Two 
illuminates how Morocco, specifically, has become increasingly unappealing to black migrants. 
The Borders 
States that close and secure national borders are “fueled by populations anxious about 
everything from their physical security and economic well-being to their psychic sense of ‘I’ and ‘we.’”
 Ceuta and Melilla, fraught with these emotions which arise from being the only land borders which 60
Europe shares with Africa, have become sites enclosed by hyper-violent frontiers. Border patrol in the 
cities work in tandem with the physical walls to produce the very spectacle they are each trying to 
prevent. The sentinels scan the horizon for oncoming wall-scalers while the patrol boats scan for rafts 
59 Ibid 15. 
60 Brown 69. 
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looking to enter the cities by sea. Above all, their success depends on reaching out to those to support 
their work financially and socially: politicians and journalists. For the patrol authorities, “the border 
becomes a resource in which the avowed business is to make sure no one enters. They must not lose 
it.” The guards and the walls they patrol produce what has been deemed the border ​spectacle​ or the 
border ​game​.  Andersson gives a background to this theory: 61
“To the political scientist Peter Andreas, border policing is an audience-directed ‘ritualistic 
performance’ aimed at ‘recrafting the image of the border,’ making it more solid and real. To 
Nicholas De Genova, building on Marxist theorist Guy Debord’s notion of the ‘society of the 
spectacle,’ it is a show of enforcement in which migrant illegality is made spectacularly visible. 
Through the interplay between enforcement and an excess of discourses and images, he says, 
the border spectacle ‘yields up the thing-like fetish of migrant ‘illegality’ as a self-evident and 
sui generis​ ‘fact’, generated by its own supposed act of violation.’”  62
 
In this performance, Border Patrol culture ‘paramilitary’ agents have come to consider themselves as 
an extension of the military. Border enforcement, in attempting to manage the migrant ‘crisis,’ has 
blurred the distinction between “security and policing, on the one hand, and militarization and 
war-making, on the other.”   63
Borders in the extraterritorial communities are a militarized zone which assume approaching 
migrants to be enemies in a war. During a bigger ​asalto​ (attack,) pepper water is sprayed on migrants 
along with disorientating sharp flashes of light.  Notably, this description of the border-crossings as 64
‘attacks’ helps Spain to justify the lethality of its non-contiguous borders. In 2012, reporters discovered 
that the Guardia Civil were using rubber bullets on migrants scaling the walls of Melilla and that many 
61 Andersson 138. 
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Moroccan guards on the other side are actually equipped with guns.   Proliferation of “‘military 65
strategies, culture, technologies, hardware, and the combat veterans who are now policing the border’ 
(Kraska 503)” stress that force and the threat of violence are the most appropriate ways to solve these 
problems, most likely exacerbated in the cities by their historical and current military and government 
presence.  66
“In recent decades, military personnel have constituted 15-20 per cent of the Spanish 
population of the cities and some 8-13 per cent of the Spanish Army has been based there 
(Ballesteros, 1990: 140-42). These are Spain’s ‘last foreign bases’, yet they do not contribute to 
the defence of Spain: rather they are a security problem because they are in Spanish hands 
(​Africa Confidential​, 27/14 (1986); Bequer, 1988: 148).”  67
 
No one seems to consider that any of these expensive resources would be unnecessary should the cities 
not be European territory. But in order to maintain Spanishness, the collective Spanish authorities 
have taken on a prodigious role as soldiers. Such a performance requires that they protect their 
communities from foreign invasion. Of course, only on the appropriate stage can this be 
accomplished: the material fortress. 
In the twentieth century, most countries did not invest heavily in border security 
infrastructure at all. It was expensive and ineffective against military invasion, which was their primary 
purpose at the time.  Up until the early 1990s, Ceuta and Melilla had only “patches of tangled and 68
weed-strewn coils of barbed wire” to mark their international boundaries. With the arrival of more 
migrants, the Spanish state, with the help of E.U. funds, slowly built up the frontiers.  But it wasn’t 69
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until the 2000s that serious fortification began. At this time, Spain erected a new ring of fences around 
the cities.  Today Melilla’s land border is approximately 11 kilometers long. Beginning at the inner 70
perimeter, there stands a six-meter tall metal fence, followed by a second fence with an oscillating top. 
Webs of dense metal cables adjoin this fence to a third.  Sensors and bright spotlights are installed 71
throughout the perimeters. Infrared cameras, 104 of them to be exact, and microphones now surveil 
every centimeter of the barrier. A ditch, three meters deep, demarcates where Spain ends and Morocco 
begins. Here, there is a mesh trap called the ​sirga tridimensional​ which tenses upon contact and aims 
to immobilize.  On the Moroccan side two more fences stand, each adorned with barbed razor wire.  72 73
Thermal cameras and sound-and-motion sensors track movement in Moroccan territory.  Above, one 74
can often see helicopters circling in the sky. The scene in Ceuta is similar though to a lesser extent. 
Despite Melilla’s purpose no longer being to serve as a bulwark against military invasion, most all of 
the defenses are new additions from the last two decades. As one of the most fortified borders in the 
world, its primary motive today is to keep out civilian migrants.  75
A Spanish security company called Proytecsa is credited for many of the recent technological 
advances of Melilla’s improved ​valla​ (fence). With these additions, “as in Eurosur and the Spanish 
radar and satellite systems, technology was waved as a magic wand, promising migration controls 
shorn of violence and politics.”  Originally planned for both enclaves, Spain’s side of Melilla, with no 76
barbed wire, is professed to be humane. Authorities even sell the mesh as being not harmful, though its 
70 Alexander 14. 
71 Harris. 
72 Andersson 162. 
73 Harris. 
74 Andersson 155. 
75 Harris. 
76 Andersson 161-162. 
Cassidy 23 
location in the space between the two countries conveniently allows for diffusion of responsibility 
anyways. Regardless, E.U. funds constructed the indisputably violent Moroccan fences in an act 
which allows Spain to continue to uphold its reputation as the most benevolently bordered European 
country.   77
Another less subtle discretion is that Ceuta is also newly fortified, but the aggressive razor wire 
remains. Coastal borders of the enclaves have been updated with similar reinforcement measures, as 
Spain recently installed an underwater detection system in the Strait of Gibraltar.  The practice of 78
hiding in cars which are driving ‘legally’ into the cities (as well as those getting onto ferries headed 
towards the mainland) have been made more difficult, for Spanish officials now have sonic devices 
that they attach to the hoods of passing vehicles to check for the number of heartbeats inside.  So 79
despite the many risks that the fortification of the border walls present to those scaling it, this path 
continues to be the most viable for migrants and consequently the primary setting for the spectacle. 
Above all, the bordering of Ceuta and Melilla work to produce “unequal power and consequently 
unequal life chances,”  as exemplified by the following description of ​border-crossings​.  80
The Spectacle 
Only men and boys scale Ceuta and Melilla’s walls as their means of reaching Europe. In the 
midst of dealing with frequent raids, abuse, sexual assault on women, and illegal repatriations at the 
hands of the Moroccan authorities, the migrants organize and plan. First they assess the threat, 
checking to see how many guards are on duty. Knowing that both the Spanish and Moroccan forces 
77 Human Rights Watch. 
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are well-trained and well-armed, the favored tactic is strength in numbers. A very similar scene plays 
out over and over again: With bare feet and great determination, the migrants charge the first 
Moroccan fence. They carry ladders which are topped with hooks that can latch onto the tops of the 
walls. More experienced men and boys go first, followed by the rest.  Each triumphant scaling of a 81
wall brings the risk of falling straight into the arms of the Guardia Civil, that is if they are not ensnared 
first by the ​sirga tridimensionel​. With a crowd, they usually manage to overpower the guards, allowing 
just a few each time to get all the way over and to the immigration center, the Centro de Estancia 
Temporal de Inmigrantes (CETI). If even one makes it, the mission is considered a success. In 2005 
the Melillan frontier saw one of the greatest crossing attempts of this kind, wherein hundreds stormed 
the fences, resulting in fourteen migrants killed by gunfire and many more expelled back to the desert.
  82
Organization like this is key, for it is a team effort. Migrants have “created intricate 
communities in the hills outside the enclaves, with structures of ​chairmen​, or rotating leaders, for each 
national community, UN-styled ‘blue helmets’ to keep the peace, and democratic structures for 
decision making.”  Other tactics include wearing old clothes because news ones will snag on the 83
barbed wire, or wearing cotton instead of nylon for the same reason. They wear gloves so that they can 
grab onto the wire directly without harm. A migrant explained to Andersson, “Blades might cut into 
your arms or legs, but you had to avoid getting caught in the stomach or crotch.”  As the border 84
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patrol and the border have militarized, so have the efforts and some communities of border-crossers, 
especially after the 2005 ​asalto​. 
“As controls extended away from the vallas with greater efficacy after 2005, other 
militarization effects also appeared on migrant circuits. Sites of departure were called striking 
points; migrant bunkers became known as ghettos… Militarization also reached into the social 
circuits of the adventure. Nigerian smuggling rings––known as the ‘task force’ or the Taliban, 
replete with fearsome ‘commandos’––had set up their own bunkers, including a ‘prison’ in 
Rabat, where migrants were taken hostage until relatives paid up. The ‘mafias’ that officials 
kept referring to were coming into existence thanks to the very controls supposed to fight 
them.”  85
 
Border-crossers’ tactics are a reflection of the nation’s own violent – and often illegal – strategies.  86
From the ladders to the clothes, methods that they use to traverse the boundaries are merely 
reactionary, developed in response to the limits that the nation imposes against them. In reality, “the 
existence of the border itself produces the violence that surrounds it,”  and yet the cyclical nature of 87
the borders in Ceuta and Melilla only normalizes Spain’s brutality and excuses the depiction of 
migrants as dangerous and fearsome. This cycle also serves to obscure the debate on why these walls 
need to be Spanish in the first place, reinforced by both the language of Spanish politicians and 
journalists as well as the ways in which Morocco helps Spain to border its enclaves. 
Morocco’s Contribution 
Since 2004, the Gendarmerie Royale and the Guardia Civil have joined forces in the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar, patrolling and preventing undocumented migrants 
from reaching European shores.  Unbound by the E.U. regulations which prohibit the internal 88
border practices from total militarization, the Moroccan bordering of Ceuta and Melilla contributes 
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greatly to the violence at these frontiers. For example, consider the aforementioned disparity in guns: 
Spanish guards use rubber bullets, while some of the Moroccan patrols use real ones. At the age of 
seventeen, a Cameroonian migrant going under the pseudonym ‘Frank’ told Human Rights Watch 
about a crossing attempt where he fell off the first fence back into Morocco. Moroccan Auxiliary 
Forces grabbed Frank and, after disentangling him from some barbed wire, hit him with a 
‘baseball-bat-like [stick]’ on his knees, shins, and elbows, badly fracturing the bones. For six minutes he 
was beaten up by more than ten men. Another boy from Cameroon, a 12 year-old named Jean-Luc, 
was trying to climb the same fence when the Moroccan military threw rocks at his head, making him 
lose his grip and fall. Eight of them together hit him with an identical bat, cutting his head open so 
badly he was blinded by his own blood. Human Rights Watch also reported: 
“Moroccan Auxiliary Forces who encountered [migrants] as they tried to cross into Melilla 
used excessive force, not only to prevent them from crossing, but also, seemingly, to punish 
them. In addition to reporting that members of the Moroccan Auxiliary Forces beat them 
when they were caught trying to scale the fence into Melilla, many migrants, including 
children, also said that Moroccan security officials beat them after the Spanish Guardia Civil 
returned them from Melilla.” 
 
Olivier from Cameroon was in a group of sixteen migrants given directly to Moroccan authorities after 
being captured on the Melillan side of the wall. On return, authorities brought them to the forest on 
Gurugu. There, they instructed the migrants to lay in a row on the ground on their stomachs with 
their hands above their heads so that the Moroccan gendarmes could hit them.  
Moroccan police also frequently invade these forests, destroying the migrant shelters and 
personal property, stealing their valuables, and arresting male migrants without charge.  This is 89
elaborated upon in a passage from Alexander’s piece: 
“‘If the police find you,’ explained Khadija, a 36 year-old woman from Mali, ‘and they want to 
do more than just take the money out of your pockets, if they want a bigger bribe from you, 
89 Ibid. 
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then they threaten to take you to the desert…’ she explained how the impossibility of 
accumulating any money in Morocco is what makes migrants like her feel trapped. ‘I need 
money to go home. I need money to go north. I need money to go anywhere.’ Yet, the routine 
exploitation and extortion of those living in Morocco has made any movement outside of the 
country’s borders all but impossible.”  90
 
Morocco, in undertaking further bordering efforts for Spain, has become an the accomplice in 
imagining the authenticity of the cities. By outsourcing some security measures, Spain surreptitiously 
deflects responsibility for some of the violence and abuse transpiring at the southern borders. 
Nonetheless, Spain orchestrates the Moroccan business of bordering Europe. Morocco is only 
incentivized to help because it receives E.U. funds explicitly for this reason. Assisting Ceuta and 
Melilla in reinforcing their immediate ​limits​ is one way in which Morocco does Spain’s bidding. The 
second chapter elaborates on how the border is externalized even further through the third-party 
political agreements which motivate Morocco to execute the Spanish prerogative. 
Elasticity 
According to the ‘Law on the Right to Asylum and Refugee Status,’ a Spanish law adopted in 
1984, Spain must afford certain provisions on behalf of asylum-seekers and migrants who come within 
national bounds, which include Ceuta and Melilla.  Anderson mentions that elasticity ​may​ be a 91
component in the imaginative boundaries of a nation. In the Spanish communities there are several 
glaring examples, the first being a flagrant ignorance of commitments to international law and human 
rights in the 500 yard-stretch of soil between the wall and the detention center in Melilla. Despite that 
it is Spanish territory, this final stretch for border-crossers is so crucial because the Guardia Civil acts as 
if it is not, as if here, in one of the most pridefully Spanish cities in the whole country, Spain’s 
democratic code is absent. Human Rights Watch interviewed fifteen migrants who ‘successfully’ 
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crossed into Melilla. Eleven of them, including five children, said that the Spanish authorities handed 
them over to Moroccan authorities directly, without doing what they are supposed to do on European 
territory: taking any steps to determine their legal status. The other four migrants said that they were 
also returned to Morocco, just not handed over to the authorities directly. Through these actions: 
“...the Guardia Civil contravened Spain’s obligations under the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which includes a right to seek asylum, and the EU returns directive. This directive, 
adopted in 2008 by the European Parliament sets out minimum standards for the treatment of 
undocumented migrants during returns, and requires EU member states to ensure that any 
returns to countries outside the EU respect the principle of nonrefoulement, and take account 
of the right to family life and the best interests of the child.”  92
 
Rapid removal of children is a violation of the migrants’ human rights to receive information. By 
removing them from Melilla so rapidly, the Spanish authorities "violated the children’s rights to see 
specialized service providers and interpreters and to receive information about applying for asylum.”   93
Abuse is not limited to Moroccan authorities, nor to Spanish ones in their actions towards the 
migrants on top of the walls. The Guardia Civil also uses strategies of harm within this in-between 
space. All but one of the fifteen migrants Human Rights Watch interviewed who succeeded in 
crossing the Melilla border disclosed that the Guardia Civil, who got to them before they could get to 
the CETI, proceeded to use excessive force by kicking them with their boots and beating them with 
police batons. Jean-Luc, the boy who suffered at the hands of the Moroccan authorities, experienced 
more unnecessary cruelty upon crossing into Melilla. He explained that “the Guardia Civil hit [him;] 
they shocked [him] with a neutralizer [apparently a Taser]. Both times [he] was hit with boots and 
belts… They didn’t ask [him] anything and gave [him] back to the Moroccans.”  Here, the guards, 94
despite their legal obligations, do not question how many among those they expel are refugees, like in 
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the case of Abraham, nor “why humane treatment should be predicated on legal categories of 
identification in the first place.”  Merely touching the ground on the other side of the wall should at 95
least guarantee that procedures take place to determine one’s status yet this is not the case because of 
the hyper-imagination present in the extraterritorial communities. Through their actions in this space, 
Spanish authorities contradict their defense that the soil in Melilla is Spanish. One can and should 
compare the Guardia Civil with soldiers, but perhaps a parallel drawn with ​criminals​ is more suitable.  
Nations, in their imaginative ‘flexible’ quality, maintain that their boundaries are authentic 
despite the convenient exploitation of land as demonstrated by the lawless buffer encircling Melilla. 
The frontier is malleable in another sense: it enables ​formal​ crossings through a passageway which has 
also become the setting of a thriving ​informal​ economy. Absurdity does not begin to express the 
contradictory border in Melilla. Of the goods and people moving through here which are branded 
‘illegal,’ the former is restricted and abused, while the latter is the one whose mobility is allowed and 
even encouraged. This manifestation of elasticity is deconstructed in the third chapter in terms of 
community. 
No one unravels the limits of Spain’s possessions better than Andersson when he writes, “If 
the European Union has increasingly come to resemble a gated community, Ceuta and Melilla are its 
most concrete manifestation. As ethnographers have noted, the gating of wealthy enclaves is a 
contradictory enterprise: aimed at shutting dangers out, they may help foment the very fears they 
guard against.”  These communities have taken on the responsibility, as the locations of Europe’s 96
southernmost borders, as sites of extraordinarily harsh border and immigration control. Often, the 
authorities here try to frame this role as the enclaves’ contribution to Spain, as they nobly protect the 
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nation from the onslaught of undesirable peoples. Yet as Gillespie noted, these places do not 
contribute to the defense of Spain but are security threats in themselves. As was discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, an entire 98 percent of those coming ‘illegally’ into Spain do so through 
points of entry other than over the walls of the extraterritorial cities.  
In actuality, Spain’s choice to occupy these places, situating European Union territory in 
mainland Africa, is in itself a pull factor which entices desperate migrants to subject themselves to 
excessively violent borders. All of the cities’ limitations are enacted under the guise of ‘security’ when 
the true purpose is to preserve their nation-ness, in spite of a geography which unavoidably disposes 
them to foreign ‘invasion.’ And so, despite centuries of state practices designed to regulate mobility, so 
many moving people “continue to die at the edges of modern, civilized, and democratic states.”  They 97
die, they are injured, and they are subjected to human rights violations, posing the prevailing national 
question of “whose lives are regarded as lives worth saving and defending, and whose are not.”  98
Protecting the modernity, civilization, and democracy of those who belong comes at the expense of 
those who do not, and bordering “restores an imago of the sovereign and his protective capacities.”  99
Anderson claims that “ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, 
for many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.”  In 100
Ceuta and Melilla, innate fragility encourages many to be willing, not so much to die, as to kill and to 
harm for their imagined Spanishness.   
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Chapter Two – As Sovereign 
 
“In the older imagining, borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded 
imperceptibly into one another. Hence, paradoxically enough, the ease with which pre-modern empires 
and kingdoms were able to sustain their rule over immensely heterogenous, and often not even contiguous, 
populations for long periods of time.”  - Benedict Anderson 101
 
As the previous chapter illuminated, the modern imagining of nations constructs borders that 
are quite the opposite of porous and indistinct. Rather, they are pronounced demarcations–fixed and 
conspicuous–for they determine where one nation’s sovereignty ends and another’s begins. Brown 
says that there are two types of sovereignty-border relationships. In the first, fences come about ​before 
sovereignty. This type of sovereignty, “without specified jurisdiction or enclosure and without even 
the promise of containment or protection,” seeks an already demarcated realm to situate power within. 
The second is fencing ​after​ sovereignty. Here, a nation which lacks the “sovereign powers to delimit 
and secure its territories and populations,”  erects borders as a solution. Brown points to the latter as 102
the modern manifestation, theorizing that “it is the weakening of state sovereignty, and more precisely, 
the detachment of sovereignty from the nation-state, that is generating much of the frenzy of 
nation-state wall building.”   103
Extraterritorial communities like Ceuta and Melilla are remarkable because they exhibit both. 
Distinctive constitutional provisions curate the local sovereignty ​in​ the bordered cities. This is 
displayed in their journey to autonomy, which entailed differentiating them just enough to address 
xenophobic concerns of the European Union but not enough to allow Morocco to point to them as 
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not sovereignly Spanish. On the other hand, additional bordering help from Spain’s southerly 
neighbor reinforces its central sovereignty ​over​ the cities. By way of third-party political agreements, 
Spain recruits Morocco to export the boundaries of the nation even farther south, ameliorating its 
dominion over the lands while deflecting responsibility for the means through which Moroccan 
authorities effectuate their side of the bargain. This dual manifestation compels Ceuta and Melilla as 
ideal backdrops for examining sovereignty–the second critical authenticity element of contemporary 
nationness. 
Navigating Autonomy 
In the post-Francoism era, the nation found itself wrestling with the issue of decentralization. 
Many communities in Spain had histories precluding them from the familiar narrative of Spanishness, 
such as the minority nationalist groups of Basque Country and Catalonia. In addressing this issue, the 
Constitution of 1978 established seventeen autonomous communities. Each is entitled to relative 
representation within the main government of Madrid in matters such as budgeting, sanitation, and 
education. Decentralizing contiguous Spain led to the tricky question of autonomy for Ceuta and 
Melilla. Many feared that Morocco would cite any special arrangements made for the cities as evidence 
of their colonial status,  but that no distinction would also risk diluting the cities’ Europeanness by 104
empowering resident Moroccan nationals. To navigate this predicament, the Constitution included its 
fifth transitional provision: “The cities of Ceuta and Melilla may set themselves up as Self-governing 
Communities if their respective City Councils so decide in a resolution adopted by the overall 
majority of their members and if the Cortes Generales so authorize them by an organic act, under 
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section 144.” Even so, in the following years Spain would struggle to develop a framework for the 
enclaves which was satisfactory to all. 
City councils in the enclaves, having long entreated Spain for autonomy, were thoroughly 
disappointed when the first statutes of December 1985 granted them very little self-governance. The 
draft “excluded the word ‘autonomy’ for fear that international law might be cited to suggest that this 
conferred rights to self-determination (EPI, 18 February 1985).” Europeans scorned the statutes as “no 
more than municipal charters,” while North Africans were disturbed at “the absence of any reference 
to Arabic or to the Berber language Tamazight.”  Thus, in the beginning of 1986, there were large 105
demonstrations in the cities, on the part of both Spanish parties seeking political autonomy which 
resembled that of the other communities as well as Muslim organizations demanding cultural 
pluralism. In June the general election resulted in PSOE gains in Ceuta over the right-wing Coalición 
Popular.  Consequently, a second draft was developed which “insisted that the cities were integral 106
parts of an indissoluble Spanish nation, but proposed to grant the authorities there a degree of 
autonomy, including similar financial arrangements to those governing the autonomous 
communities.” It suggested an establishment of assemblies which could elect a president and issue 
regulations but would not possess any legislative powers. In spite of the modifications, there were the 
same cries of discontent as had followed the first propositions.  107
In 1995, the cities adopted a third statutory draft which labeled Ceuta and Melilla as 
autonomous cities​, distinguishing them from the mainland’s autonomous communities. According to 
one Spanish diplomat, the statutes were “the weakest that Madrid could get away with, in terms of 
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responding to strong local and national opposition demands for autonomy.”  There is a greater 108
loyalty to Spain by Europeans in Ceuta and many Muslims here identify as Spanish, perhaps as a result 
of the relatively smaller community. Here, the stipulations of their autonomy were widely rejected 
while in Melilla, where Spain’s hold is not so firm, there was considerably less outrage. 
Notwithstanding the shift in the population ratio which has made the Muslim community the 
majority, Melilla is more exposed to Moroccan pressure because of its proximity to Nador, a highly 
politicized city of 750,000. Gillespie elaborates, “with an economy based on trade and smuggling, 
Melilla is indeed vulnerable.”  Yet even though minority nationalisms here have a stronger hold, most 109
maintain a sort of ‘dual patriotism.’  Now, many Ceutans and Melillans argue that a greater 110
dependence on the central government actually strengthens their connection to contiguous Spain,  111
summoning to mind Anderson’s sardonicism that “it is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into 
destiny.”  Internal mastery of autonomy comprises half of the destiny. The other half is the 112
subordination of powers that would “rival, disperse, or fragment it,”  which Spain achieves by 113
manipulating sovereignty into a device. 
The Moroccan Claim 
Most Moroccans protest the Spanish occupation of Ceuta and Melilla.  They believe that 114
Spain has unjustly stolen the cities from their nation and that they should be Moroccan territory, 
paralleling Spaniards’ feelings about Gibraltar.  The officialdom in Morocco, would–and 115
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infrequently does–concede to feeling the same. Morocco’s reaction to the 1995 decision “was the 
weakest that Rabat could get away with, in terms of satisfying nationalist sentiments at home,”  and 116
it is generally unsupportive of  Muslims fighting for representation in Ceuta and Melilla. This is 
because there is a “degree of compensation for Morocco in having a European presence in territory 
claimed as her own,” as the pragmatic regime in Rabat is acutely aware.  117
“Fortunately for Spain, it has been in Morocco’s interests to pursue her territorial claims by 
gentle diplomacy. The persistence of the Western Sahara dispute, Rabat’s desire to draw closer 
to the EU and the economic advantages of the territorial status quo have encouraged King 
Hassan to restrain the forces of militant nationalism. A more aggressive policy would risk 
undermining the important level of bilateral relations developed since the 1980s and would 
exacerbate the economic problems of underdeveloped northern Morocco, where a loss of trade 
and jobs has threatened to kindle political dissent.”  118
 
As Moroco is stationed just miles from the internally borderless European Union, it is a natural 
stopover for many migrants and asylum seekers on their journeys north.  It has long served as a site of 119
interaction between Arabs and Europeans, often assuming a role as middleman between Africans and 
Europeans.  Morocco–in an attempt to capitalize on its geography–and Spain–in an attempt to 120
alleviate the burden of migration on the already-endangered national identity of the territories–have 
formed a symbiotic relationship, one which effectively outsources bordering and therefore strengthens 
Spanish and E.U. sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla.  121
Third-Party Political Agreements 
In light of rising anti-immigration sentiments throughout the E.U., the Union has 
institutionalized efforts to manage irregular migration into Europe through enabling countries just 
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outside its external borders–such as Libya, Ukraine, Turkey, and Morocco–to do its bidding.  By 122
recruiting Morocco to border the walls and deter incoming migrants, Spain can reinforce its hold on 
the cities without having to personally respond to all the nuances of the ‘crisis’ unfolding right outside. 
One facet, as mentioned before, is immediate bordering assistance, such as the Spanish fence which is 
often described as ‘humanitarian’ because it does not have the harmful razor wire, while the Moroccan 
fence–built with E.U. funds–is certainly not.  This chapter addresses how Spain exports its 123
southernmost borders even further out by pressuring Morocco to amend its own immigration policies 
and, more importantly, to sign repatriation agreements which lead to the illegal deportation of tens of 
thousands sub-Saharan Africans out of Morocco every year, allowing for “state control over migrant 
bodies before migrant bodies ever reach the confines of the state.”  Compensation for Morocco 124
comes in the form of “development aid, military equipment, and a small number of work permits for 
highly skilled Moroccan emigrants” on behalf of the E.U.’s bank.  The extraterritorial communities 125
showcase Brown’s notion of the “conceit of the political dominance or containment of other powers”
 through the economic incentives extended on its sovereign behalf from Spain to Morocco. 126
Raids 
In 2013, the E.U. signed a joint immigration agreement with Morocco, providing capital in 
exchange for help in keeping migrants from reaching the enclaves’ fences.  Evoking notions of the 127
“Prevention Through Deterrence” strategies U.S. authorities performed around the Mexican border, 
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Moroccan strategies are also ones of deterrence. Raiding camps in the borderlands is the initial 
approach. Human Rights Watch interviewed 67 migrants in sites around Nador and Oujda, 42 of 
whom described frequent raids. The stories demonstrated “a pattern of abuse by law enforcement 
officials during [Moroccan authorities’] raids,” such as robbing migrants of money and phones, 
burning their shelters, passports, and other documents, and using excessive force against them.  Each 128
of the 42 accounts reported how the Moroccan authorities arrested male migrants without first 
identifying or conducting an assessment of the migrants’ legal status.  
Even migrants who showed officers a visa or other documentation which proved that they had 
permission to stay were arrested, including those from Senegal, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire. For these 
nations, Morocco does not require any entry visas and their nationals are granted a stay of up to 90 
days without any visa at all. Burned, too, were the documents of these West Africans which proved 
their ‘legality.’  Women also experienced atrocious treatment. On a December morning in 2012, the 129
gendarmerie and the police together attacked a migrant who was five months pregnant. They abused 
her and others in their sleep. She told them of her condition, but nonetheless they beat the woman and 
even kicked her in the stomach, all the while yelling that she was not welcome in their country.  130
Forces proceeded to arrest about nine men. From raids, arrested migrants do not go on to fill 
Moroccan jails. Rather, in a strategy which has been termed ‘pushing-back,’ Moroccan authorities 
bring them to the Moroccan-Algerian border in a creative interpretation of fulfilling the repatriation 
agreements they have made with Spain.  
Pushing Back 
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In the 225-kilometer stretch of road of Moroccan-Algerian border between Bouarfa and 
Oujda one is again reminded of the U.S.-Mexico border, for both are home to dangerous and 
constantly changing desert frontiers.  Of the 67 migrants interviewed by Human Rights Watch, 37 131
said that Moroccan authorities also forcibly expelled them to the Moroccan-Algerian border.  None 132
of them were given a statement or a document charging them with anything or provided with any 
opportunity  to challenge their expulsion, nor were they granted access to a lawyer nor an interpreter, 
nor brought before a judge.  Migrants said that when police did provide them with a statement it 133
was in Arabic and, though they could not understand it, they were forced to sign it.  One migrant 134
recounted what the police said to him: “You have no rights here.”  In the same vein, the authorities 135
did not conduct age determinations for unaccompanied children before expelling them. None of the 
interviewed unaccompanied migrant children were treated as such–by being given, for example, 
guardianship and legal help–even when they declared their age.   136
Pierre is a migrant from Ghana who was included in the interviews. He described a raid and his 
consequent expulsion: 
“There is no rest here. Every morning, the gendarmes come. Yesterday [December 2, 2012], I 
was trying to prepare food and they came. I asked them if they could wait until I ate a bit, 
knowing that I wouldn’t have food, only a long walk after deportation [from the border back 
to Oujda], but they refused. It was 6:30 a.m. and I walked with them and obeyed because if 
you refuse, they will beat you up.”  137
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Pierre evidently escaped abuse in this instance, unlike another migrant from Cameroon named 
Nicholas. Upon his arrival at the Algerian border, Moroccan military men kicked Nicholas so badly 
that he was peeing blood.  After being brought to the Algerian border, options are minimal. 138
Migrants can try to re-enter Morocco and make the trek back to the edges of Europe, living in the hills, 
evading the authorities, and regularly attempting the dangerous crossing and risking recapture. 
Alternatively, they can give up and begin the long journey back to their embattled, impoverished, or 
otherwise distressed home countries. The former prevails as the more popular recourse.  
Morocco is party to both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems. On paper, Morocco “appears to uphold international standards 
for the protection of refugees and asylum seekers”  yet in practice it does not, as migrants can attest 139
to. Spain’s obligations under E.U. and international human rights law are compromised by the actions 
of the Moroccan security forces. The abuse is carried out as a means of ​earning​ the E.U. finances that 
Spain gives Morocco to help it achieve European jurisdiction over Ceuta and Melilla.  While not 140
explicitly demanding that Moroccan forces earn it in these ways, Spain does not argue against it, and, 
moreover, directly feeds it through illegally handing over border-crossers, knowing full well what the 
migrants’ fate will be.  
Culpability 
The Guardia Civil also has a direct hand in illegally repatriation of migrants from Ceuta and 
Melilla to Algeria. Nicholas tells Human Rights Watch of his experience at the border following a 
successful scaling of the wall in Melilla. 
“I was alone and I was running across to the third fence. The Guardia Civil intercepted me and 
told me that I would be taken to the campo [CETI] after the hospital [because he was injured] 
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but instead they sent me back to Morocco. They told me, ‘Get the hell out! You know that if 
you come here, you know you get a caning…. You know you are going to be hit [by the 
Moroccans].’”  141
 
As the Spanish authorities delivering migrants to Moroccan authorities demonstrates, Melilla’s ‘buffer’ 
proliferates more than direct Spanish violence. It is in this zone that Spain becomes involved with the 
pushing back business, though it had rejected any responsibility for the ways that Morocco executes its 
side of the bargain until a few years ago: 
“In the spring of 2015, the president of Melilla, Juan Jose Imbroda Ortiz, announced to 
international media that the aim of returning Africans to Morocco, in place of properly 
repatriating them to their countries of origin, was to eliminate the ‘prize’ of letting them stay in 
Spain for a review of their asylum applications after having entered ‘illegally’ (Goodman 
2005).”  142
 
For the first time Spain publicly acknowledged the practice of pushing back. President Ortiz expressed 
his hopes that this strategy would “reduce the incentive for migrants to leave their homes,” 
demonstrating a complete ignorance for the factors pushing migrants north.  It was this 143
monumental moment in which Spain finally admitted to the pushing back of migrants across the 
enclave borders into Morocco, as well as deporting them from the mainland back to Morocco rather 
than to their proper countries of origin. A day after his speech, Spain’s cabinet “quietly approved” an 
“aid package” of €3,000,000, intended for structural changes to the Moroccan borders, new weapons 
for the security forces, and additional Spanish border patrol teams.  Moreover, in relying on the 144
subordination of its neighbor, Spain’s walling and protecting of Ceuta and Melilla endeavors to 
project a power and efficaciousness which legitimizes its hold on the territories. The Spanish state, 
knowing that control here is weak and illegitimate, exercise these excessive measures in order to save 
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face while performatively contradicting itself.  For, south of the contiguous Spanish borders, there 145
seems to be an understanding that Spain is no longer bound to the same obligations to human rights 
that it professes to be, allowing it and its allies to carry out abuses which would ordinarily be 
punishable under European law.  146
Europe’s response to the ‘illegal’ migration of Africans has sparked the debate about “rich 
countries’ relations with their southern neighbors.”  Morocco is not a ​passive​ receiver of E.U. aid. In 147
trying to capitalize on its position in the Mediterranean crossroads, it is ​actively​ accepting a role of 
police dog in exchange for the benefits which money and a promise of development can bring to its 
quite poor country, according to Professor Boudoudou of Rabat’s Université Mohammed V.  He 
explains that Morocco “accepts this role with its own dream of being something great’” knowing full 
well what Spain gains from it, too.  And as the third chapter will explore, in a sense, Morocco is 148
doing for Spain what Spain is doing for the E.U. People in Western democracies like that of Spain 
declare themselves to be sovereign, yet Spain’s extraterritorial cities prove that actually power is still 
designated to “autocratic state action,” including actions which violate democratic principles and 
human rights allegiances. 
Just as Spain’s limitations have made Ceuta and Melilla a sort of theater, so, too, have the 
country’s ventures at establishing them as genuinely Spanish.  Situating them within the 149
Constitution through the allowance of a form of local representation and alleging them to be under 
Spanish rule through the externalization of E.U. power are the two main acts in the charade that is 
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Ceuta and Melilla’s sovereignty. According to Brown, “we have known all along that popular 
sovereignty has been, if not a fiction, something of an abstraction with a tenuous bearing on political 
reality.”  Thus, by their manifestations of sovereignty, the cities persist as magnified sites of the 150
pretending​ that is required to imagine a nation.   
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Chapter Three – As a Community 
 
“In contemporary conditions of war and heightened nationalism, we imagine that our existence is bound 
up with others with whom we can find national affinity, who are recognizable to us, and who conform to 
certain culturally specific notions about what the culturally recognizable human is.”  - Judith Butler 151
 
In extraterritorial places, the state overcomes hyper-exposed walls and delicate sovereignty 
through extremified limits and exploitations of power. Thus, the focus of the first two chapters was 
the way in which a ​state​ imagines the nation-ness of its extraterritorial possessions. This, in turn, 
informs the ​people​ within and how they imagine their own authenticity. In the pursuit of such a 
quality, the Spaniards in Ceuta and Melilla seek, also, to earn a respected place within national and 
international discourse. Geography prones communities to confrontations with ​others​ in 
non-contiguous national sites. Moreover, as Spaniards in Morocco view these confrontations as 
challenges to the Spanish identity, they must declare their Spanishness even louder than the ordinary 
Spaniard. This third and final chapter explores community through the extraordinarily visible 
demonstrations of it within Ceuta and Melilla. Spaniards nourish their own community identity by 
framing other communities – Moroccans and clandestine migrants living in the cities – as inherently 
other and disruptive. Moreover, the following pages delve more emphatically into how the ‘others’ 
deploy tactics as a means of resisting the overwhelming marginalization and discrimination, which, 
though characteristic of a nation, are a critical aspect of these kinds of geopolitically fragile settings.  
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“Ceuta es Española!” 
Spanish nationals maintain that Ceuta and Melilla are Spain, and therefore that the 
community is authenticated through a cultural, ethnic, and religious connection to the nation. 
Spanish Ceutans and Melillans are at times characterized as reluctant and at other times as viscerally 
opposed to diversity and cultural pluralism. Downplaying the presence of the Muslim community is a 
tool to profess a uniform nationness to themselves, their country, and greater Europe, for these groups 
feel that a Muslim presence compromises the Spanishness of the enclaves in distinguishing them from 
the demographics of the mainland communities. Moreover, this specific ​other​ in the demographic is 
one which invokes the national memory of the ​Reconquista​. Colón describes a personal encounter of 
this memory: 
“Cristianos reminded me of this bit of history in various informal settings: in bars, over dinner, 
in the Assembly, in cafés, and on walks with friends. Despite the separation of the Catholic 
Church from the state after Francisco Franco’s dictatorship ended in 1975, the triumph of 
Catholicism over Islam is still indicated by many state-sponsored rituals, traditions, and 
everyday practices—especially in Ceuta and Melilla (Driessen 1992; Stallaert 1998).”  152
 
Deploying “representations of a nation rooted in historical accounts” is an instrumental imagining of 
community amongst Christians in the enclaves striving to “establish the Spanishness of their land.” 
While these same historical accounts contribute to the idea that Ceuta and Melilla “fall outside the 
natural boundedness of the Spanish nation in the Iberian Peninsula,” Christians nevertheless refute 
any disparities between their communities and those of the mainland.  Moreover, they consistently 153
create obstacles for those who are outside the Spanish historical, religious, and cultural narrative, such 
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as in 2000, when Christian parents in Ceuta protested the education of thirty Moroccan teenagers in 
the town center where their own children were going to school.   154
In a press briefing following the massive and tragic 2005 border-crossing, a journalist posed a 
question regarding the possibility of future joint Hispanic-Maghrebi sovereignty over the cities to 
Spain’s president at the time, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. His infamous refusal to answer enraged 
and frightened the already nervous Spaniards in the enclaves, inspiring more anti-Muslim and 
anti-Moroccan demonstrations, accompanied this time by chants of “Ceuta es Española!” Yet, 
Moroccans living permanently in the cities actually possess Spanish citizenship, and are, therefore, 
Spanish, ​contradicting the Hispanic-Christian position. Moroccan nationalist and Muslim 
community members maintain that they are just as much Ceutan or Melillan as the Spanish residents, 
longing to be included in the cities’ narratives. Moreover, Spanish authorities, in their delayed attempts 
at integration or more accurately, assimilation, were themselves responsible for stirring up 
controversies regarding cultural pluralism.  155
“We are Melillans!” 
After the death of Dictator Francisco Franco in 1975, Spain’s democratic journey was one of 
rapid ‘Europeanization.’ Preparation for E.U. entry in 1986 encouraged both the fortification of 
borders (especially southern ones) as well as the nation’s first Aliens Law, eternally stamping Spanish 
democracy by an innate bond between control and clandestinity.  In Ceuta and Melilla, the new law 156
angered Muslims.  
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“The Aliens Law provoked protests in Ceuta and Melilla because it was applied uniformly 
throughout Spain, regardless of the existing rights of Muslims in the two cities. Under the new 
law, foreigners living in Spain had to apply for a residency permit-cum-identity card. Those 
without papers by the end of January 1986 (a deadline subsequently extended to March 1) 
faced expulsion.”  157
 
Furthermore, under this new civil code, being born in Spain guaranteed no automatic right to 
citizenship “if both parents were foreigners.”  Up until this point, the PSOE had had considerable 158
success in the cities among European populations. But the ​rebellious Muslim​ animated the fearful 
Spaniard, precipitating “a strong undercurrent of racism,” during 1985-1987, which has been 
described as Melilla’s period of unrest.  Emerging as a leader during this time was a man named 159
Aomar Mohamedi Dudú, who headed the new Terra Omnium movement, which demanded the 
political and cultural equality of Muslims, as well as the Partido de los Demócratas Melillenses, a group 
seeking institutional representation for Ceutan and Melillan Muslims. 
“At first, Dudú’s demands were for Melilla’s Muslims to be granted the same rights as the 
Europeans, and to have their religion, languages and history recognized and respected… 
Inevitably, Dudú’s banner was that of minority rights, yet at first he played down the 
communal divide by insisting not only on the Muslim, Arab and Maghrebi character of 
Melilla, but also on the common ​melillense​ identity. ‘We are not foreigners, we are Melillans!’ 
was the slogan of the biggest Muslim demonstration during this period.”  160
 
Though Muslims insisted on maintaining their own cultural identity, most enjoyed the advantages of a 
closer association with Spain, as they do still. In 2005, Spanish per capita income was “14 times that of 
Morocco, a difference much higher than that which separates the USA and Mexico (six times).”  It is 161
not surprising, then, that despite intercommunity tensions and the weak cultural pluralism of the 
cities, they remain preferable to the much less economically appealing cities in Morocco. However, 
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those who reside in the latter are not excluded from benefiting from a Spanish territory in their nation. 
Elastic in another sense, the Melillan frontier authorizes legal crossings through a passageway which 
simultaneously provides the setting for a thriving black market.  
The Informal Economy 
For the Muslims residing ​around​ Ceuta and Melilla in the poor peripheral Moroccan towns, 
one of their most viable options for upward mobility is within the informal economy which the 
European boundaries provide. ​Trabando​, deriving from the Spanish word ​contrabando​, is the atypical 
commerce that moves between the territories. Melilla’s fiscal regime has established that goods 
imported into the enclave are subject to special custom duties (Impuesto sobre la Producción, los 
Servicios y la Importación, known as IPSI) which are much lower than those paid in Spain and in 
Morocco, and therefore goods for sale in the enclave are exempt from the value-added tax that is levied 
in the Spanish mainland. It is therefore a lucrative trade, as goods are purchased in Melilla and sold in 
Morocco at a higher price. But purchasing the goods on either side is entirely legal, making it fairly 
risk-free because it is organized in plain view on either side. However, the transportation is the ​illegal 
aspect, for it is moved furtively to avoid custom duties. Smuggling here financially provides for around 
45,000 people. It ensures livelihood to entire communities and sustains the economy of an enclave that 
has never had its own industry or any natural resources to exploit.  Bermant notes that the majority 162
who participate in the informal economy are Moroccan, or of Moroccan descent, and that this is a 
legacy of the historical economic and political structures “which for centuries favored Spanish 
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residents.” Finally, it is all made possible by the informal agreements made with Moroccan custom 
officers. Supplementing their meagre incomes with bribes guarantees the smooth passage of goods.  163
So, inflexible as the border is for clandestine migrants, its unique geographic position has 
facilitated a black market wherein European goods are smuggled into Africa. But in July 2010, the 
increasingly tense relations, most recently characterized by a surge of racist treatment against 
Moroccans passing through Melilla’s border post of Beni Enzar, culminated in massive 
demonstrations at the fences: 
“Civil society organizations, which many observers suspected of being agents of the Moroccan 
secret police, blocked the importation of cement, bricks and fresh produce. Activists plastered 
posters across the border area that mocked Spanish policewomen, whom they accused of 
insulting its citizens. Spain’s conservative opposition leader and premier-to-be, Mariano Rajoy, 
visited Melilla… Meanwhile, in an unusual move, Morocco accused the Guardia Civil of 
abandoning sub-Saharan migrants on a raft outside Ceuta. Along with these tensions came an 
influx of clandestine migrants into Melilla at a rate not seen in years, prompting speculation in 
the Spanish Congress and media about Morocco letting them through, flung like projectiles 
into the enclave in their improbable, inflatable, ‘toy’ boats.”  164
 
As representations of the Europeanization of the frontiers, Spanish policewomen became a convenient 
target. Meanwhile, sub-Saharan migrants “could serve as a weapon to enforce their aims.” At these 
edges of Spain, ‘uninvited actors’ came to be hijackers of the border spectacle for their own benefit, 
though “on behalf of a larger geopolitical order.”  165
“The mere presence of the border between Nador, Morocco, and the Spanish enclave of 
Melilla created lawlessness… you would not expect to find criminality so flagrantly tied to 
places such as borders, which are, after all, locales established for the express purpose of 
exhibiting state power. ” 166
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Of the people and goods moving through this space which are branded ‘illegal,’ the latter is the one 
whose mobility is allowed, and even encouraged, while the former is restricted and abused. The 
contradiction is only worsened by the hypocrisy of these border guards who, despite taking their roles 
so seriously as aligning their role with that of the military, practice illegality through both their neglect 
of laws in regards to migrants as well as their roles in the game of smuggling.  
“Keep all Africans out at all costs.” 
Returning to the question posed in the first chapter, why is it that so few of the many 
sub-Saharan migrants crossing into Europe via the Western Mediterranean do so through Ceuta and 
Melilla? Just as Morocco is never intended to be the final destination for migrants from West and 
Central African, neither are its stolen cities. Despite their Europeanness, they are not as enticing lands 
as those in the internally borderless E.U. However, this do not explain why there is not the influx of 
migration here that one would expect from such supposedly geographically advantageous territories. 
Rather, the unpopularity of the cities as permanent places of residence are consequences of first, as 
discussed before, the near-impenetrable fortresses, and second, as discussed in this section, the internal 
barriers placed that Spain constructs within. On top of which, both of these are merely elements of 
one supreme reason: Spain’s recognition that the cities are being used as mere gateways into the 
Peninsula or farther north and their voluntary obligation to secure the ​causa sui ​borders for the E.U. 
Thus, these are the ways in which Spain assumes its own role of passivity, similar to that of Morocco, 
except that for the European nation, the end goal is not the hope of prosperity and development, but 
rather the right to keep its North African toys.  Moreover, Ceuta and Melilla are toys for the E.U., 167
for if Spain can safeguard the short lengths of Melilla, then controlling all of the vast terrestrial borders 
167 Alexander 19. 
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of the E.U. is manageable.  The ultimate goal, then, is not to keep migrants out of these cities, but 168
rather to prevent them from ‘invading’ the ones across the Strait. 
Two migrants, aged 14 and 17, had been living at the reception center for minors in Melilla, La 
Purísima Concepción Fort, for one year and seven months, respectively, until one day when they were 
apprehended on the streets. They told Human Rights Watch about how two “plainclothes inspectors” 
approached them on the streets while they were visiting a friend at the CETI. Amin, the 17 year-old, 
told the story: 
“We got in the car and [the Spanish inspectors] drove and asked us questions. “How did you 
get into Melilla?” They wanted to know the name of the person and the car that brought us. 
We talked until we got to the border. They took us to the border discreetly, under a bridge... 
There were two cars of the Guardia Civil with two people in each and two motorcycles…We 
told them we were minors, but they expelled us from the car. They opened the fence at the 
border where cars go through and three Moroccans came, one military and two in civilian 
clothes. The inspector talked in Arabic, gave us to the Moroccans, and closed the fence. The 
inspector stayed watching [from the Spanish side of the fence] while [the Moroccan security 
force] hit us. We were making noise and then the inspector asked the Moroccans to take us 
away. They kicked us; they took our jackets and clothes. We were in socks and underwear.’”  169
 
Meanwhile, Gregorio Escobar, the governor of Melilla, sits in his well-appointed office in a clean grey 
suit. “We have a responsibility to take care of this border, not only for our own citizens but for all of 
Europe. Also, Spain has a responsibility to take care of the people who happen to get inside,”  he tells 170
a reporter from the Guardian.  
“Ici c’est Guantánamo!” 
One requisite of the 1984 law is that Spain provides state-sponsored accommodation in any of 
the four detention centers spread across the country for at least sixty days or until a migrant’s case has 
been reviewed. Should a candidate’s application be approved, they are guaranteed “the right to a work 
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permit and social welfare, including subsidised healthcare and education.” Applications which are 
denied require the person to leave Spain within another sixty days or else be repatriated to their 
country of origin. But for years, Spain’s centers have been severely overcrowded. Alexander writes: 
“The average case now takes more than twelve months to review, and individuals are routinely 
being denied their basic rights and overflowing into privately funded-aid organisations or 
makeshift camps, where it is easy for them to ‘escape’ the system. According to Frontex, the 
number of asylum applications received by the E.U. rose by 44% over the past five years, and in 
Spain alone, it rose by 64% last year. Given the current state of crumbling refugee and asylum 
systems across the E.U., it is no wonder that those working for the Guardia Civil are instructed 
to, as one guard reported to me, ‘Keep all Africans out at all costs.’”  171
 
Following the tragic summer of 2005, or, more accurately, from the spectacle plastered across the 
newspapers, a “politics of containment” was born. Spain’s usual ‘keep out’ and ‘keep away’ style 
evolved into a ‘keep’ style during this summer, generating a spectacle ​within​ the enclaves, in hopes of 
changing Ceuta and Melilla from “springboards into traps” in the words of “police, activists, and 
lawyers alike.”  The consequences of this strategy reached a breaking point five years later.  172
In Ceuta, the CETI is separated from the rest of the town by forested hills and a few miles of 
coast. Housing a maximum of 512, there are eight ‘prefab modules,’ with eight rooms in each, and 
eight beds to a room. As Ceuta does not have the room, resources, or an eagerness to accommodate 
asylum seekers, Spain periodically chooses approved candidates from the CETI to send to the 
peninsula. But even migrants who are never chosen–or rejected in the first place–find ways of reaching 
the peninsular shores.  As parts of the Schengen Area, it is easier (though not as easy as continental 173
Europe) to smuggle someone to the other side of the Strait from Ceuta or Melilla than from Moroccan 
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territory.  Upon reaching the detention center, migrants are overjoyed. There are big smiles and 174
celebrations as they eagerly anticipate their departure to the mainland: 
“Many [migrants] had died in the desert, found themselves stranded in Morocco’s ‘ghettos’ 
and ‘bunkers’ or been deported, penniless and paperless, to the dust bowl of northern Mali. 
The migrants in Ceuta were thus an exclusive crowd. Having finally breached the E.U. 
frontier, they thought fortune was smiling at them–but Ceuta, they soon found out, would 
only flash a grim grin of irony…”  175
 
The triumph of reaching the CETI does not guarantee much. Primarily run by aid organizations, 
particularly the Spanish Red Cross, the CETI is a ‘sorting center’ where migrants are “screened, 
recorded, and assigned identity categories in an elaborate process of ‘flow management.’” But in 2010, 
by the end of a hotter-than-usual summer, fresh arrivals would push the CETI over capacity.  To 176
understand why, one must know about the cards.  
Until 2009, migrants whose asylum application had been accepted for processing were given a 
tarjetas amarilla​, a yellow card, which could be used as a passport to the peninsula. As a result of a 
new asylum law this year, the cards, previously much desired, came to represent stagnation instead of 
mobility.  Migrants, some of whom had been there for as much as three years already, reeled at 177
discovering this development, feeling restless and cheated. Thus, from a circumstance where the same 
amount of migrants were crossing in illegally, but none were being let out, came the summer of 2010. 
Not allowed to leave, work, or do anything at all except reel at the injustice of it all, Ceuta’s summer of 
discontent saw migrants protesting in the street, wearing their CETI administered knock-off ‘Addidas’ 
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shirts, holding up cardboard signs of protest, with slogans like “Ici c’est Guantánamo!” and “CETI is a 
prison.” Thus, the migrants became “prime objects of scrutiny, intervention, and pity, they would 
become Europe’s most abject Other, fully formed ‘illegal immigrants.’”  Playing the part of 178
spectators, journalists, police, and camp workers fed into the fears and the frenzy. One El Faro 
newspaper headline read: 
“ABOUT A HUNDRED SUB-SAHARANS, WELL COORDINATED, ORGANIZE A 
DEMONSTRATION ASKING FOR FREEDOM”  179
 
While another night, a primetime television network had this scrolling at the bottom of the screen: 
“MIGRANTS WITH BANNERS IN CENTRAL CEUTA - THEY FIND THEMSELVES 
VIRTUALLY ‘IMPRISONED’”  180
 
For Spaniards everywhere, from the peninsula to the enclaves, these words fed into the nationalist 
discourse of ‘scary’ and ‘organized’ migrants, with little emphasis placed on Spain’s part.  In this 181
rendering of genuine community, Anderson’s notion of nationalism through print journalism is 
demonstrated. The newspaper reader or television viewer, “is continually reassured that the imagined 
world is visibly rooted in everyday life.”  Butler’s idea of nationalism supports this claim, as she posits 182
that it produces and sustains “a certain version of the subject,” especially through powerful forms of 
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media.  Thus, through expressions of language, and ‘us’ or ‘we’ versus ‘them,’ a nation is imagined. 183
In Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish, Christian communities find solidarity ​together​ by being ​against.   
183 Butler 47. 
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Conclusion 
 
“You judge a society by the decency of living of the weakest.”  - Zygmunt Bauman 184
 
What do Ceuta and Melilla tell you about nationness? Here, emotional quests for legitimacy 
which define historical and present Spanish nation are eagerly pursued and furiously protected by 
Spain and by the resident Spaniards. Bordering and sovereignty transform from tools into gifts, which 
prove the love that a nation has for its children. Extraterritorial communities, though in a way 
replicating​ their ‘homeland,’ are more so ​infatuated​ with it. The nation calls to them, promising 
identity, protection, and solidarity, and thus they deliver themselves: they ​belong​ to it. Romanticized is 
the state control which is challenged by citizens of many ordinary territorial bounds. Unless it is to 
demand to be more genuine, or affirm an infiltrated Spanishness, Ceutan and Melillan Spaniards 
cannot speak out against the state. They cry for their nation to see them, to recognize them, as the state 
demands the same from the international community. But in doing so, extraterritorial nationalist 
communities curate themselves to be so visible that they render invisible, and thus ​undeserving​, the 
‘others.’ Reverence of the distant prestigious power that is the ‘nation,’ an entity which bounds–and 
commands respect through doing so–an inclusive right to security or economy or culture or religion 
or race, circumscribes the same for those who do not fit into the national identity. Glorious as the 
184 Kennard, Matt. “Zygmunt Bauman Interview.” 4 Oct. 2013, 
mattkennard.tumblr.com/post/63075191723/zygmunt-bauman-transcript. Accessed 27 Apr. 2019. 
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nationness here may seem, it only serves to exacerbate that atrocious exclusivity which defines the 
modern sovereign nation.   
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Photos 
 
 
“In the forests surrounding Melilla, you’ll find makeshift camps, constructed from scraps of tarp and 
trash.” Vox Borders Series, Johnny Harris – Vox (2017) 
 
 
“Migrant men on a hillside of the dusty, dishevelled outskirts of the Moroccan village of Shadia 
outside Melilla.” ​Obinna Anyadike – IRIN News (2015) 
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“A golfer swings as African migrants sit atop a fence during an attempt to cross from Morocco into the 
Spanish enclave of Melilla.” Time Magazine, José Palazón – Reuters (2014) 
 
 
“African migrants celebrate as they enter the CETI immigrant center in Ceuta.” El País, Fabian 
Bimmer – Reuters (2018) 
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“Spanish authorities arrested two more sub-Saharan migrants on Wednesday for alleged violence while 
forcefully crossing the Spain-Morocco border at Ceuta.” Morocco World News, ​F.G. Guerrero – EPA 
(2018) 
 
 
“More than 700 migrants make violent border crossing into Ceuta: Migrants show their wounded 
hands after jumping the border fence” El País, Joaquín Sánchez – El País (2018)   
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